Delayed payment of employees' contribution towards PF/ESIC
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Delayed payment of employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC not allowable: SC

 

Contents News/Article  Date:   13th  October 2022

Relating to which  Act  The  Employees Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952;  The Income Tax Act, 1961; The Finance Act 1987

Type:  Supreme Court Judgement – 

Pertains to       Case Name: Checkmate Services P. Ltd Vs CIT (Supreme Court of India) Appeal Number: Civil Appeal No. 2833 of 2016 Date of Judgement/Order: 12/10/2022 : Courts: Supreme Court of India


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If you see the opinion of this Court, it says that the reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non-obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee’s income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non-obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts which are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained, and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such 34 interpretations were to be adopted, the non-obstante clause under Section 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee’s contribution on or before the due date as a condition for deduction.

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Subject:   COURT UPDATES  –   Delayed payment of employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC not allowable: SC

For greater details, appended below is the complete news item

 

Delayed payment of employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC not allowable: SC

 

Source: TAXGURU

 

Case Law Details

Name; Checkmate Services P. Ltd Vs CIT (Supreme Court of India)

Appeal Number: Civil Appeal No. 2833 of 2016

Date of Judgement/Order: 12/10/2022

Courts: Supreme Court of India

The factual narration reveals two diametrically opposed views in regard to the interpretation of Section 36(1)(va) on the one hand and proviso to Section 43(b) on the other. If one goes by the legislative history of these provisions, what is discernible is that Parliament’s endeavour in introducing Section 43B [which opens with its non-obstante clause] was to primarily ensure that deductions otherwise permissible and hitherto claimed on mercantile basis, were expressly conditioned, in certain cases upon payment. In other words, a mere claim of expenditure in the books was insufficient to entitle deduction. The assessee had to, before the prescribed date, actually pay the amounts – be it towards tax liability, interest or other similar liability spelt out by the provision.

Section 43B falls in Part V of the IT Act. What is apparent is that the scheme of the Act is such that Sections 28 to 38 deal with different kinds of deductions, whereas Sections 40 to 43B spell out special provisions, laying out the mechanism for assessments and expressly prescribing conditions for disallowances. In terms of this scheme, Section 40 (which too starts with a non-obstante clause overriding Sections 30-38), deals with what cannot be deducted in computing income under the head “Profits and Gains of Business and Profession”. Likewise, Section 40A(2) opens with a non-obstante clause and spells out what expenses and payments are not deductible in certain circumstances. Section 41 elaborates conditions which apply with respect to certain deductions which are otherwise allowed in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability etc. If we consider this scheme, Sections 40- 43B, are concerned with and enact different conditions, that the tax adjudicator has to enforce, and the assessee has to comply with, to secure a valid deduction.

Delayed payment of employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC not allowable: deposited by the employer

The scheme of the provisions relating to deductions, such as Sections 32­37, on the other hand, deal primarily with business, commercial or professional expenditure, under various heads (including depreciation). Each of these deductions, has its contours, depending upon the expressions used, and the conditions that are to be met. It is, therefore, necessary to bear in mind that a specific enumeration of deductions, dependent upon fulfillment of particular conditions, would qualify as allowable deductions: failure by the assessee to comply with those conditions would render the claim vulnerable to rejection. In this scheme, the deduction made by employers to approved provident fund schemes is the subject matter of Section 36 (iv). It is noteworthy, that this provision was part of the original IT Act; it has largely remained unaltered. On the other hand, Section 36(1)(va) was specifically inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, w.e.f. 01-04-1988. Through the same amendment, by Section 3(b), Section 2(24) – which defines various kinds of “income” – inserted clause (x). This is a significant amendment because Parliament intended that amounts not earned by the assessee, but received by it, – whether in the form of deductions or otherwise, as receipts, were to be treated as income. The inclusion of a class of receipt, i.e., amounts received (or deducted from the employees) were to be part of the employer/assessee’s income. Since these amounts were not receipts that belonged to the assessee but were held by it, as trustees, as it were, Section 36(1)(va) was inserted specifically to ensure that if these receipts were deposited in the EPF/ESI accounts of the employees concerned, they could be treated as deductions. Section 36(1)(va) was hedged with the condition that the amounts/receipts had to be deposited by the employer, with the EPF/ESI, on or before the due date. The last expression “due date” was dealt with in the explanation as the date by which such amounts had to be credited by the employer, in the concerned enactments such as EPF/ESI Acts. Importantly, such a condition (i.e., depositing the amount on or before the due date) has not been enacted in relation to the employer’s contribution (i.e., Section 36(1)(iv)).

The significance of this is that Parliament treated contributions under Section 36(1)(va) differently from those under Section 36(1)(iv). The latter (hereinafter, “employers’ contribution”) is described as the “sum paid by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution towards a recognized provident fund”. However, the phraseology of Section 36(1)(va) differs from Section 36(1)(iv). It enacts that “any sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions of sub-clause (x) of clause (24) of section 2 apply if such sum is credited by the assessee to the employee’s account in the relevant fund or funds on or before the due date.” The essential character of an employee’s contribution, i.e., that it is part of the employee’s income, held in trust by the employer is underlined by the condition that it has to be deposited on or before the due date.

 

Delayed payment of employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC not allowable: filing of the returns under the Income Tax Act

It is, therefore, manifest that the definition of contribution in Section 2 (c) is used in entirely different senses, in the relevant deduction clauses. The differentiation is also evident from the fact that each of these contributions is separately dealt with in different clauses of Section 36 (1). All these establish that Parliament while introducing Section 36(1)(va) along with Section 2(24)(x), was aware of the distinction between the two types of contributions. There was a statutory classification, under the IT Act, between the two.

It is evident that the intent of the lawmakers was clear that sums referred to in clause (b) of Section 43B, i.e., “sum payable as an employer, by way of contribution” refers to the contribution by the employer. The reference to “due date” in the second proviso to Section 43B was to have the same meaning as provided in the explanation to Section 36(1)(va). Parliament, therefore, through this amendment, sought to provide for identity in treatment of the two kinds of payments: those made as contributions, by the employers, and those amounts credited by the employers, into the provident fund account of employees, received from the latter, as their contribution. Both these contributions had to necessarily be made on or before the due date.

Take an example, in the present case, the respondents have deposited the contributions with RPFC after 31st March (end of accounting year) but before the filing of the returns under the Income Tax Act and the date of payment falls after the due date under the Employees’ Provident Fund Act, they will be denied deduction for all times. In view of the second proviso, which stood on the statute book at the relevant time, each of such assessee(s) would not be entitled to deduction under Section 43-B of the Act for all times. They would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year of account in which they pay the contributions to the welfare funds, whereas a defaulter, who fails to pay the contribution to the welfare fund right up to 1-4-2004, and who pays the contribution after 1-4-2004, would get the benefit of deduction under Section 43-B of the Act.”

There is no doubt that in Alom Extrusions, this court did consider the impact of the deletion of the second proviso to Section 43B, which mandated that unless the amount of employers’ contribution was deposited with the authorities, the deduction otherwise permissible in law, would not be available. This court was of the opinion that the omission was curative and that as long as the employer deposited the dues, before filing the return of income tax, the deduction was available.

A reading of the judgment in Alom Extrusions would reveal that this court, did not consider Sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va). Furthermore, the separate provisions in Section 36(1) for employers’ contributions and employees’ contributions, too went unnoticed.

One of the rules of interpretation of a tax statute is that if a deduction or exemption is available in compliance with certain conditions, the conditions are to be strictly complied with.20 This rule is in line with the general principle that taxing statutes are to be construed strictly and that there is no room for equitable considerations.

 

Delayed payment of employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC not allowable:  Section 43B – were introduced to ensure timely payments were made by the employer to the concerned fund

When Parliament introduced Section 43B, what was on the statute book, was only the employer’s contribution (Section 34(1)(iv)). At that point in time, there was no question of an employee’s contribution being considered part of the employer’s earnings. On the application of the original principles of law, it could have been treated only as receipts not amounting to income. When Parliament introduced the amendments in 1988-89, inserting Section 36(1)(va) and simultaneously inserting the second proviso of Section 43B, its intention was not to treat the disparate nature of the amounts, similarly. As discussed previously, the memorandum introducing the Finance Bill clearly stated that the provisions – especially the second proviso to Section 43B – were introduced to ensure timely payments were made by the employer to the concerned fund (EPF, ESI, etc.) and avoid the mischief of employers retaining amounts for long periods. That Parliament intended to retain the separate character of these two amounts, is evident from the use of different language. Section 2(24)(x) too, deems the amount received from the employees (whether the amount is received from the employee or by way of deduction authorized by the statute) as income – it is the character of the amount that is important, i.e., not income earned. Thus, amounts retained by the employer from out of the employee’s income by way of deduction, etc. were treated as income in the hands of the employer. The significance of this provision is that on the one hand, it brought into the fold of “income” amounts that were receipts or deductions from employees’ income; at the time, payment within the prescribed time – by way of contribution of the employees’ share to their credit with the relevant fund is to be treated as deduction (Section 36(1)(va)). The other important feature is that this distinction between the employers’ contribution (Section 36(1)(iv)) and employees’ contribution required to be deposited by the employer (Section 36(1)(va)) was maintained – and continues to be maintained. On the other hand, Section 43B covers all deductions that are permissible as expenditures, or outgoings forming part of the assessees’ liability. These include liabilities such as tax liability, cess duties etc. or interest liability having regard to the terms of the contract. Thus, timely payment of these alone entitles an assessee to the benefit of deduction from the total income. The essential objective of Section 43B is to ensure that if assessees are following the mercantile method of accounting, nevertheless, the deduction of such liabilities, based only on book entries, would not be given. To pass muster, actual payments were a necessary pre-condition for allowing the expenditure.

The distinction between an employer’s contribution which is its primary liability under the law – in terms of Section 36(1)(iv), and its liability to deposit amounts received by it or deducted by it (Section 36(1)(va)) is, thus crucial. The former forms part of the employers’ income, and the latter retains its character as an income (albeit deemed), by virtue of Section 2(24)(x) – unless the conditions spelt by Explanation to Section 36(1)(va) are satisfied i.e., depositing such amount received or deducted from the employee on or before the due date. In other words, there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts – the employer’s liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees’ income and held in trust by the employer. This marked distinction has to be borne while interpreting the obligation of every assessee under Section 43B.

 

Delayed payment of employees’ contribution towards PF/ESIC not allowable: opinion of this Court

 In the opinion of this Court, the reasoning in the impugned judgment that the non-obstante clause would not in any manner dilute or override the employer’s obligation to deposit the amounts retained by it or deducted by it from the employee’s income, unless the condition that it is deposited on or before the due date, is correct and justified. The non-obstante clause has to be understood in the context of the entire provision of Section 43B which is to ensure timely payment before the returns are filed, of certain liabilities which are to be borne by the assessee in the form of tax, interest payment, and other statutory liability. In the case of these liabilities, what constitutes the due date is defined by the statute. Nevertheless, the assessees are given some leeway in that as long as deposits are made beyond the due date, but before the date of filing the return, the deduction is allowed. That, however, cannot apply in the case of amounts that are held in trust, as it is in the case of employees’ contributions- which are deducted from their income. They are not part of the assessee employer’s income, nor are they heads of deduction per se in the form of statutory pay out. They are others’ income, monies, only deemed to be income, with the object of ensuring that they are paid within the due date specified in the particular law. They have to be deposited in terms of such welfare enactments. It is upon deposit, in terms of those enactments and on or before the due dates mandated by such concerned law, that the amount which is otherwise retained and deemed an income, is treated as a deduction. Thus, it is an essential condition for the deduction that such amounts are deposited on or before the due date. If such an interpretation were to be adopted, the non-obstante clause under Section 43B or anything contained in that provision would not absolve the assessee from its liability to deposit the employee’s contribution on or before the due date as a condition for the deduction.

 In light of the above reasoning, this court is of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the approach of the impugned judgment. The decisions of the other High Courts, holding to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. For these reasons, this court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

 

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